

"No man can tell what will be the issue of war; but, when we look to the past, I ask, with what rational hope such a war as the late one can be begun, and with what rational ground of success? Is it intended, that, at the present period of the year, when Austria is unprepared, any operations should be undertaken? Or, that every thing should be prepared to begin the war in the next campaign? If Austria should move, and the consequence should be, what is not impossible, productive of serious disasters, what would become of our hopes of continental connexions? What of the liberties of Europe? What of the prospect of setting limits to the power of France, justly and rationally considered already too formidable? Under such circumstances, and on information so scanty as that now before the house, it becomes wise to men to consider well before they grant money for the purpose of subsidising foreign powers."—MR. FOX'S Speech, 21st June, 1805. Parl. Debates, Vol. V. p. 537.

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## CONVOYS.

SIR;—I was much gratified to find in your Register, a statement of the embarrassments which the West-India trade has experienced with regard to convoys. The truth of your observations must be apparent to every one; and, I was in hopes that you would have carried your inquiries a little further, and you would have found cause for remark with regard to the outward bound, as well as the homeward bound convoys.—The immense sum of money which is raised by the convoy duty, authorises merchants to expect both regular and sufficient convoys. Instead of which, there are no more of them, and their force less powerful than they were the beginning of last war, when no such tax existed, and when ships could sail as suited their owners and the planters, without asking for licenses or any thing else.—That the convoy act, provided it was properly attended to by the Lords of the Admiralty, is beneficial to the country, I really believe; but clogged as the trade now is, without the care they have a right to from that board, it is truly detrimental to both planters and merchants. Convoys are now frequently so weak as scarce to deserve the name of them, and in many instances the ships which are sent from the West Indies are in such bad repair, that they require more assistance from the merchantmen, than they can afford to them. But what I have chiefly to complain of, is the delay which constantly occurs with almost every convoy that is appointed. The Admiralty feel no compunction for keeping 40 or 50 ships two or three months after they first notified a convoy would sail, at an enormous expense to the ships, and a great disappointment to the planters. A conspicuous instance is at present well known here. Your paper, upon West-India convoys, fully shews the hardships many planters have laboured under. Martial law in Jamaica prevented

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many planters from making half their crops in that part of the island, which is late in its seasons, and knowing their inability to ship by the August convoy, earnestly requested ships might be sent them by Christmas. A request was immediately sent to the Admiralty, and a convoy appointed to sail the first of September. A dozen large ships were immediately got ready at an extra expense, and sent to Cork, but not an appearance of a commodore. The end of September a second letter was written by the West-India merchants, and forwarded to Mr. Marsden. The answer was, directions had been sent the 25th September for the convoy's sailing the first favourable wind. It was natural to suppose, that we should hear of the fleet having sailed five days after the 25th, particularly as the winds were almost invariably fair for them; but, by this day's letters, on the 15th of October, they were still there. Six weeks after they were appointed to sail, at a serious expense to the owners of the ships, and a great disappointment to the planter, who is now prevented getting his produce off before the May fleet. No explanation is given for this conduct; but people say, it is because the Rochefort squadron is not accounted for; but, surely a country whose government boast of having near a thousand ships of war, cannot be afraid of sending out a convoy on account of five sail of the line being at sea. If they do, what will become of our boasted trade and commerce? Trusting that these few hasty hints will induce you to inquire into the business, and make known to the world, that our Admiralty takes no more care of outward than it does of homeward bound convoys, I am, &c.—A. T.—*Liverpool, Oct. 21, 1805.*

ABBÉ DE LA MARRE.

SIR,—I think it may possibly tend to a useful purpose, to request your most guarded caution upon the subject of the Abbé de la

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Marre's statements. I am biased by no prejudice against that gentleman, nor any personal consideration whatever. The only motive I can have for any sort of interference in the matter in question, is my zeal in the cause of truth and honour.—I am extremely apprehensive, Sir, that this angry, and, as I think, unfortunate misunderstanding, will give a plausible handle to the mean, unfeeling herd, that have from the first set their faces (to use a hackneyed phrase) against the gallant French nobility. This illustrious and most unfortunate body have been treated throughout Europe, with a harshness, which I confess, has lowered my opinion of the human character. I could hardly have imagined, that even the lowest classes of mankind could have wanted some degree of generous compassion for such a case: and, indeed, the lowest classes are those that I principally acquit upon this occasion. Their demeanour in general does not subject them to any particular reproach; and were they even convicted of illiberality, every allowance is to be made for the various disadvantages under which they necessarily labour.

“ Chill penury repressed their noble rage

“ And froze the genial current of the soul.”

No, Sir; the persecutors of this gallant body, were to be looked for amongst the vile tribe of money-makers of every denomination, and the degenerate portion of the higher classes. The *low man* is in reality found in every rank of society; while the brightest flame of virtue will sometimes burn in a cottage. In my own particular country, (Ireland) a country, which were I to define it, I should (without the apprehension of a blunder) denominate that in which the common man is a gentleman; in that country, Sir, I can assure you, I should be extremely sorry to injure any one of our peasants, by a comparison with some very opulent men, and bustling characters, that I could name in this metropolis.—I find I have made a most unwarrantable digression. To return to the subject of this letter: you would not, as I am convinced, be accessary to any reflection upon the character of the French nobility, that could afford a cause of triumph and self complacence, to the meanest, most selfish, and degenerate description of the inhabitants of this island. The charge, were it true, does not impeach the *body* of the French nobility, in the eye of any man of honour. I know nothing of the Abbé de la Marre. The Count de V . . . . . is a nobleman of established character, not to be shaken upon trivial grounds; and, I

am certain is incapable of any unjust reflection upon the Abbé's conduct, unless it were indeed, in one of those moments of perverseness or weakness, from which some of the best and greatest characters have at times, unhappily, been found not to be exempt. Henry the IVth was known to speak with harshness of Sully. Should the Count have done this gentleman any injury, he will be in haste to repair it. But it is for ever to be lamented, that any misunderstanding should arise for a moment amongst the faithful servants and adherents of Louis the XVIIIth. —As to any emigrant royalists taking or appropriating to themselves any supplies that were destined for the King of France, or his real service, I can aver, upon grounds, which, I think, were I to state them, would be as satisfactory to the public as they are to me, that there was *nothing to take*. The money of this country, so far as regarded the internal affairs of France, was wholly dedicated to miserable intrigues, and worse than foolish expeditions. The insurrections of La Vendée, by which, alone, revolutionary France could have been brought to the feet of this country, was notoriously starved; the immortal actors in that glorious struggle, would have dispensed with gold; they wanted only arms and ammunition; and could never obtain them in any quantity, that did not amount to a perfect mockery of the situation in which they had so bravely placed themselves. We were here as parsimonious, as in some other things we were prodigal. These gentlemen, who were abandoned for no other reason, that I ever could discover, than that they *were* gentlemen, were often reduced to engage the enemy without powder, and not half-armed. Yet such was their spirit, and the number of their adherents, that they actually once deliberated whether they should not march to Paris. That part of the then ministry, who disapproved this cold barbarity, but who were so fatally overborne by others, best know the truth of my assertion. But when I say that the circumstance exceeds every instance of misconduct which the last war can furnish, I believe it is impossible to add any thing further to the idea that is meant to be conveyed.—I am, Sir, &c.—O. Oct. 1, 1805.

#### SHERIFFS' OFFICE.

SIR,—I have hitherto abstained from noticing J. W. G.'s letter, published in your paper of the 10th of August, in the hope that it would have been answered by some one better qualified by legal knowledge to undertake the task; no answer having ap-

peared the fol by you brough it is evi wheth land or truth or pend. your con occurred sheriff s himself, claim wh land: bu such evic support- “ delive rather, d proof in land, virt The proo that is n succeed. pecuniary action, m to the pla is, to ge object th would by The insin a sheriff's absurd an perience, difficult, motive a rectly to d and bring discredit. ter part o must leave am, Sir, &

CONTINEN the Gran cial Pap Oct. 11, The b twenty-four Gunzbur is corps— au; and ough. Th se that n rown. P n, to der al Malhe mt. The ad. Col of his



peared, I have determined on offering you the following remarks.—In the case stated by your correspondent, if an action were brought against the sheriff for a *false return*, it is evident that the only question would be, whether he had delivered the ten acres of land or not, since on that fact alone the truth or falsehood of the return would depend. I have little difficulty in saying, that your correspondent's case cannot really have occurred, because it is impossible that the sheriff should be permitted, in defending himself, to give evidence in support of the claim which a third person may have to the land: but, supposing for a moment that such evidence was admissible, how would it support the sheriff's return that "he had delivered the land to the plaintiff?" Or, rather, does not the sheriff, by offering such proof in excuse for not having delivered the land, virtually confess that his return is false? The proof or admission of which fact is all that is necessary to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. I am aware that the recovery of pecuniary damages from the sheriff in this action, may be a very inadequate satisfaction to the plaintiff, whose object most probably is, to get possession of the land; but this object there can be no doubt, the court would by some means enable him to attain. The insinuation that the courts will endure a sheriff's disobedience of their process, is so absurd and so repugnant to every day's experience, that it needs no refutation: it is difficult, however, to attribute to any good motive a misrepresentation which tends directly to depreciate the laws of the country, and bring the administration of justice into discredit. To those who understand the latter part of your correspondent's letter, I must leave the care of answering it.—I am, Sir, &c.—S. N.—Oct. 12, 1805.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

**CONTINENTAL WAR.**—*Fourth Bulletin of the Grand Army; from the French Official Paper, the Moniteur.*—Augsburgh, Oct. 11, 1805.

The battle of Wertingen was followed, twenty-four hours afterwards, by the action of Gunzburgh. Marshal Ney marched with his corps—Loison's division against Langeau; and Malher's division against Gunzburgh. The enemy, who attempted to oppose that march, were every where overthrown. Prince Ferdinand endeavoured, in vain, to defend Gunzburgh in person. General Malher attacked it with the 59th regiment. The action was obstinate, hand to hand. Colonel Lacuée was killed at the head of his regiment, which, notwithstand-

ing the most vigorous resistance, carried the bridge by main force. The pieces of cannon which defended it, were carried, and the fine position of Gunzburgh remained in our power. The three attacks of the enemy were useless; they retired with precipitation. The reserve of Prince Murat arrived at Burgau, and cut off the enemy on the right. The details of the action, which cannot be given for some days, will make known the officers who distinguished themselves.—The Emperor passed the night of the 9th, and part of the 10th, between the corps of Ney and Lannes. The activity of the French army, the extent and complication of the combinations, which entirely escaped the enemy, disconcerted them to the last degree. The conscripts shewed as much bravery and good will as the old soldiers. The weather is bad; it now rains, but the army is in good health.—The enemy lost upwards of 2,500 men in the action of Gunzburgh. We made 2000 prisoners, and took six pieces of cannon. We had 400 men killed or wounded. Major-General d'Asprée is in the number of the prisoners.—The Emperor arrived at Augsburgh on the 10th, at nine p. m. The town has been occupied for these two days. The communication of the enemy's army is cut off at Augsburgh and Landsperg, and is about to be cut off at Fuessen. The Prince Murat, with the corps of Marshal Ney and Lannes, are engaged in the pursuit. Ten regiments have been withdrawn from the Austrian army of Italy, and are coming by post from the Tyrol. Some Russian corps, who also travel post, are approaching to the Inn; but the advantages of our position are such, that we can make head against every thing.—The Emperor is lodged at Augsburgh, at the Palace of the old Elector of Treves, who has treated with great magnificence the suite of his Majesty, as they successively arrived.

*Fifth Bulletin of the Grand Army.*—Augsburgh, Oct. 12, 1805.

Marshal Soult marched with his Corps d'Armée to Landsberg, and by this means has cut off one of the chief communications of the enemy. He arrived on the 11th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, and found there the regiment of cuirassiers of Prince Ferdinand, which, with six pieces of cannon, repaired with forced marches to Ulm. Marshal Soult made the 26th regiment of chasseurs charge this regiment. It was so disconcerted, and the 26th regiment was animated with such an ardour, that the cuirassiers took to flight on the charge, and left 120 soldiers prisoners, one lieutenant-



colonel, two captains, and two pieces of cannon. Marshal Soult, who imagined that they would continue their route upon Memmingen, had sent several regiments to cut them off, but they had retreated into the woods, where they rallied, in order to take refuge in the Tyrol.—Twenty pieces of cannon, and the equipage of the enemy's pontoons, had passed, on the 10th, by Landsberg; Marshal Soult sent General Sebastiani in pursuit of them, with a brigade of dragoons. Hopes are entertained that he would come up with them.—On the 12th, Marshal Soult directed his course to Memmingen, where he will arrive on the 13th, at day-break. Marshal Bernadotte marched the whole day of the 11th, and pushed his advanced guard to within two leagues of Munich. The baggage of several Austrian generals is fallen into the hands of the light troops. He made a hundred prisoners from different regiments. Marshal Davoust advanced towards Dachau. His van is arrived at Moissac. The hussars of Blankenstein were put into disorder by his chasseurs, and in different actions, he took 60 horsemen prisoners. The Prince Murat, with the reserve of the cavalry, and the corps of Marshals Ney and Lannes, has placed himself directly in front of the enemy's army; the left of which is at Ulm, and the right at Memmingen. Marshal Ney is on horseback, on the banks of the Danube, opposite to Ulm. Marshal Lannes is at Weissenberg.—General Marmont is advancing, by a forced march, to take a position on the height of the hill; and Marshal Soult is advancing to turn the right of the enemy at Memmingen.—The imperial guard has left Augsburg for Burgau, where, probably, the Emperor will pass this night. A decisive affair is just about to take place. The Austrian army has almost all its communications cut off. It is nearly in the same situation in which the army of Melas was at Marengo.—The Emperor was upon the bridge of the Lech, when the division of General Marmont defiled. He caused each regiment to form a circle; he spoke to them of the situation of the enemy, of the approach of a great battle, and of the confidence he reposed in them. This harangue was made in dreadful weather. The snow fell in abundance, and the troops were up to the knees in mud, and were exposed to a severe cold; but the Emperor addressed them in expressions warm as fire: on listening to him, the soldier forgot his fatigues and his privations, and was impatient for the hour of the combat to arrive.—Marshal Bernadotte arrived at Munich on the 11th, at six o'clock in the

morning: he made 800 prisoners, and set out in pursuit of the enemy. Prince Ferdinand was at Munich. It appears that this prince had abandoned his army of the Iller.—Never will more events be decided in less time. Before the expiration of fifteen days, the destinies of the campaign, and of the Austrian and Russian armies, will be fixed.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

**BANK OF PARIS.**—*Report made by M. Perregaux to the Proprietors of Bank Stock, relative to the State of the Bank of Paris; October 17, 1805.*

The Bank has, in the course of the year, received sums on account of its old debts, which are reduced to a mere trifle. It has securities for about 10,900 francs, which will come successively into payment. A loss of 22,184 francs has been sustained on discounts by forgery: the culprits were discovered; but justice has not yet been able to seize them; the special tribunal is, at this moment, proceeding against them. Government has thought proper to take into its own hands the management of lotteries, with which the Bank has had no concern since the month of Thermidor. The amount of sums paid and received, has been about 4,500 millions. Discounts have been given to the amount of 630,870,368 francs, without any other loss than that above-mentioned.—The reserved funded capital, laid out in 5 per cent. consolidated, is 5,399,257 fr. producing an interest of 485,031 fr. The disposable reserve is 947,574 fr. The dividend of the first half of the year 13, was 35 fr. per share, including 5 fr. for the interest of the 5 per cents. The reserve acquired by each share is 13 fr. The dividend of the second half-year was 36 fr. per share, including 6 fr. for the 5 per cents.; and the reserve upon each share was 19 fr. 62 c. The whole year's dividend on each share, therefore, is 71 fr. and the total reserve for the year is 32 fr. 17 c. making, in all, 103 fr. 7 c. which amounts to 103-5ths per cent. on the original capital. All the reserved stock acquired, till the present time, amounts to 141 fr. 54 c. per share.—Each of you, gentlemen, will, undoubtedly, be ready to ask why, in such an evident state of absolute prosperity, the Bank has been obliged to withhold the payment of its notes in specie? This necessity has been occasioned by events which it was impossible to foresee, by the extraordinary and instantaneous removal of the crowns (*écus*) which supplied the general circulation, and which, in consequence of their momentary destination, could not



be immediately reserved; by contrary circumstances which, notwithstanding the most judicious measures, it was not possible to prevent, the departments were subjected to various incidents which contributed to produce a temporary scarcity of specie. The Bank having, from the nature of its operations, become the common centre of the major part of commercial negotiations, it is from its funds that the departments, and those who are embarked in any kind of undertaking, procure the specie for which they have occasion. The demand increased in proportion to the difficulties with which the Bank had to struggle, in order to keep up its reserved stock.—Till the last half-year, an average sum of from 15 to 16 millions was sufficient for all its services. A sum so important, and which was found to be indispensable, was a sufficient proof of the disadvantages of the individual commerce of Paris, with the departments. The unforeseen events of the year, appear to have increased it. They are already well known.—It is but too probable, that malevolence has contributed to the extraordinary run which has all at once been made on the reserve of the Bank. It is certain, that, till lately, the daily payments (deducting the receipts of Paris, and excepting the months of paying interest), did not exceed 5 or 600,000 fr. In the three last months they rose progressively to 14 and 15 hundred thousand francs, per day. These three last months, particularly, drew the attention of the government. Nothing had been neglected: the diminution of discounts, extraordinary arrivals from the interior, purchases of piastres, all were ineffectual. The reason of this is simple. In the first six months, the payments of the Bank, in specie, amounted to 123 millions; those of the six last to 143,500,000 francs. Here is a difference of 20,500,000 francs, which is the amount of the reserved fund. This difference took place, notwithstanding the purchases of piastres, which procured 17,500,000 francs during this half-year.—The Bank relied on a remittance of four millions of piastres, which would have produced 21 millions in crowns. It was to have arrived in Fructidor and in Vendémiaire. The remittance was delayed. It is particularly to this circumstance, uncontrollable either by our will or our power, that the insufficiency of the measures and the resources for procuring a supply of specie must be ascribed.—Measures, the most active and the most extensive, were taken, the moment the increase of the payments, and the uncertainty of the resources were perceived. The governors hope, that the

public will not fail to experience their good effects. We are now in the month, when the contributions arrive with facility, and in abundance. The Bank possesses good assets sufficient to justify the presumption, that their conversion into money will facilitate the means of soon returning to its ordinary course. Its embarrassment is only relative, and, for that very reason, it ought to give no serious concern. But it has furnished mistrust with a pretext for exaggerating dangers. Hence has arisen a distressing obstruction, the effects of which are felt every day.—In fact, gentlemen, it has been demonstrated to the governors, that, in ordinary times, 4 or 500,000 francs in crowns, are sufficient to supply the daily circulation of the capital. Since the 2d of Vendémiaire, the Bank has issued about 600,000 francs per day, and the demand is not sensibly diminished. But, when it is considered that this scarcity is prolonged, notwithstanding the actual payment of nearly 11 millions in crowns, in the space of three weeks, we are tempted to ascribe it to cupidity, which speculates on this temporary crisis, and to the mistrust which increases in the same ratio as the speculations of cupidity. The capital of the Bank remains, however, untouched; and it has been augmented by upwards of six millions. None of the bills to which mistrust seemed to attach discredit, was ever issued from the Bank, without being previously represented by its full value. Finally, the position of the Bank is such, that if the value of the assets which represent its capital be added to that which notes have brought into its possession, there is not one of those notes, the repayment of which, in specie, is not insured by an amount equal to twice its nominal indication. Consequently, no establishment of this kind can afford more security, more numerous motives for public confidence.—Undoubtedly, gentlemen, we ought to endeavour to resume our payments in specie, and to exert every effort to attain that object. But you will likewise admit, that this desire ought to be subordinate to the wisdom of a foresight, more necessary than ever; and that, in consequence of the machinations of mistrust, it is prudent to wait till the reserved fund is provided with such an abundance, as to prevent the credit of the Bank from being again compromised by immoderate demands. The most important duty of the governors, at the present moment, is, not to lose sight of the daily necessities of Paris, with regard to specie, nor the inconveniences inseparable from a too great scarcity of the circulating medium. It therefore behoves them to employ the ut-



most circumspection in their future measures. Their eagerness, laudable, without doubt, ought not to expose this great city to a want which might occasion the heaviest calamities.—It is necessary for the Bank, the common centre of operations, to consider what would be the results to itself of a great commotion. This consideration has made still more apparent the necessity of continuing the distribution of aids: it has neglected nothing to attain the object it was its duty to keep in view, under such circumstances. It has provided for the most urgent wants, and has employed every means to restore the abundance of specie. It has been inspired with new hopes of the arrival of the piastres, the delay of which has contributed to its embarrassment; but what will prove still more efficacious, are the wise and vigorous measures taken by his Majesty the Emperor and King, to render France triumphant over her enemies. Yes, gentlemen, the success of his arms will dispose every mind to confidence, which a glorious peace will consolidate. The specie concealed, or hoarded up, will again return into general circulation. This crisis will only serve to convince the incredulous, that, with its system and its capital, the Bank can never experience any but temporary embarrassments.

**CONTINENTAL WAR.**—*Proceedings in the Tribunal of France on the 26th of September 1805, relative to the War with Austria.*

In the name of the special commission, formed in the secret sitting of the 24th instant, and composed of Messrs. Fabre (de l'Aude), President of the Tribunal, Tarrible and Duval, Secretaries; Faure, President of the Section of Legislation; Gardin, President of that of the Interior; Jarpavilliers, Questor, Jaubert, Freville, Leroi, Jube, and Carrion-Nizé, M. Freville, Reporter of the Commission, appeared at the tribunal, and spoke as follows:

Gentlemen, if at the epoch when the acclamations of Europe ratified the treaty of Luneville, any person had said, this monument of the most brilliant victories, of the most skillful negotiations, will scarcely stand four years, you would have rejected with impatience this sinister prediction; you would have exclaimed, has not the conqueror given the highest proofs of moderation and wisdom? Has he not combined advantages which he ought not to have given up, with compensations the most satisfactory, for a power whom victory had so little favoured? If he had persisted in affirming, that the same power, so often overcome in battle, so

much favoured in treaty, should dare to rekindle the torches of war, you would only have found in this supposition a stronger motive for an honourable incredulity; for the wisdom of politicians consists in well appreciating the true interests of governments, but not in foreseeing all the wanderings of the most extravagant passions.—However, gentlemen, this sweet persuasion had only subsisted, in all its force, at the very moment when peace was signed. Soon the different steps of Austria warranted the belief, that she would rather prefer the suggestions of an inveterate hatred, than the councils of sound policy. You have seen her, gentlemen, reveal herself, in a thousand circumstances, by malevolent measures, by proceedings almost hostile. You have found your own observations in the picture so faithfully traced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Your commission will only produce details, which you too well understand, to make it necessary for me to repeat them; and which, besides, have been so happily placed in their true light, that a new exposition cannot alter their accuracy, nor diminish their interest. There is no occasion for us to dwell upon each of these particular grievances, in order to unravel the sentiments, or to explain the conduct, of the Austrian government. What we have often expected, has this day been proved. The Cabinet of Vienna, weakened by long efforts, and frightened by the most cruel reverses, was compelled to make peace; but, at the very moment that she proffered the oaths, she only wished to procure a truce, and time to recruit her forces, in order to engage with France in a new struggle. With obstinate enmity she equally resisted generosity and victory. Nothing could soften or subjugate her.—This is not the first time that Austria has trifled with treaties; she has now violated the peace of Luneville, as she did that of Campo-Formio. Scarcely had her conqueror quitted Europe, than she launched anew into the field of battle; her success only lasted during the absence of the hero; one day alone tore from her the conquests of a year. The memorable battle of Marengo, the news of which Europe heard with admiration, was not able to inspire our enemy with a sincere desire of peace. An armistice had been granted to her vanquished and almost captive army, a solemn convention had been negotiated in her name at Paris, she dared to refuse its ratification. The French government manifested its indignation; Austria offered, as a pledge of her good faith, several fortresses in Germany. Well, gentlemen, this deceitful pledge was



in our hands, an Austrian ambassador went to Luneville, and it was still necessary that the fate of arms should decide.—Is not the hatred of this implacable enemy of France sufficiently characterised? She commences the war, with the intention of stripping her of many provinces. When she obtains a momentary success, she does not profit by it, in making overtures of peace; but, when at length she solicits it, it is only after a long continuance of defeats, and with a fixed determination of breaking it, as soon as she thinks herself strong enough to return to battle. Gentlemen, let us compare these different circumstances of the actual determination of Austria, and the secret of the long understanding of our enemies will be completely revealed. We do not here see the commencement of a new war; this which now blazes up, is the same which burned thirteen years since, and which, according to the intention of Austria and England, was only suspended, not terminated. Austria, more exposed to our arms, retires first from the field of battle. This apparent defection makes no difference between her and the Cabinet of St. James's. We cannot now doubt, but that her formal consent has authorised her ally to seek the advantages of a suspension of arms, under the pretence of peace. They did not delay to affect pacific intentions, and the treaty of Amiens was concluded.—The momentary cessation of hostilities promised many advantages to the British government. It thus deceived the nation, which murmured against the prolongation of the war, and concealed its true intentions. It flattered itself, that the security of France, equalling her good faith, would give them an opportunity of gaining, by a new aggression, those odious advantages which they so often procure in the commencement of a war before it is declared. It flattered itself, that a part of our naval forces would become its prey, as easily as the greater part of our commerce. In short, it appearing to concur in the general repose of Europe, it better concealed the perfidious mystery which united it to the Court of Vienna.—Now, gentlemen, it is easy to perceive a rupture, which has no less excited our astonishment than our indignation. That England was sincerely reconciled with France, could not be a cause of surprise, but it was difficult to know how the Cabinet of St. James's should determine to neglect the aid of all continental alliance, and draw on itself alone all the weight of our forces, and to provoke the re-establishment of our navy, in putting the French government into a position that must make it the

principal object of its efforts, and of its expenditures.—Every thing is now explained; England was the advanced guard of this coalition, which at length determines to attack us with all its forces. If Great Britain commenced by contending alone with us, it is because her insular situation and maritime preponderance, inspired her with a blind confidence, particularly in the first epoch of the war. She did not reckon on the prodigious activity, which has been able, in so short a time, to launch fleets into all the seas, to construct and unite that immense flotilla, the importance of which may be judged of by the fears of those which it menaces.—You may have remarked, gentlemen, whilst our preparations augmented the terror of England, her ministers, sacrificing a part of their secret to the necessity of tranquillising the public mind, shewed themselves disposed to encourage the hope of continental alliances. Finally, when the danger became more pressing, towards the end of the last session of parliament, when they were about to vote five millions sterling, for the subsidies to be employed in the present year, if the opposition had asked, of what effect the intervention of Russia would be, without that of Austria? They would only have appeared embarrassed to conceal that they were certain of it.—These facts all tend to produce the same conviction; they are recent; they are known to all Europe. The Cabinet of Vienna hoped to bury these facts in oblivion, whilst it alleged, I know not what pretexts, relative to ameliorations, which the inhabitants of some parts of Italy had desired in their political existence. The treaty of Luneville found and left them under the influence of France, in guaranteeing to them, in the most formal manner, the right of giving to themselves the government which would best suit them. Assuredly, France was well authorised to enrol this maxim in the public law of Europe; sufficient energy, constancy, and success, had consecrated it.—This power, which sends her soldiers to provoke a war, in which her intervention is so foreign, is no longer ignorant of the force of our arms. The distance which separates the French empire from the Russian empire, reduces their relation to an extreme simplicity, and prevents between them any real subject of discussion. What is the portion of territory about which they can dispute? Have they ever even seen those fleets which bring together the most distant enemies, to weigh the fortune of the two flags against each other. These powers are so destined to be strangers to each other, that, at the time when the course of events



shall allow them to sign a treaty of peace, they must confine themselves merely to stipulate for the re-establishment of a good understanding. This has ceased for more than a year; and, down to the present day, it is only known on one side or the other, by the absence of their diplomatic agents. If Russia now decide upon open hostilities, what motive then can she assign for engaging in them? She has manifested fears for the balance of power in Europe. Yes, the balance of power was menaced, when, fifty years after the treaty of Westphalia, Russia came by surprise, as it were, into the system of Europe. The balance of power was deranged towards the middle of the eighteenth century, when Russia, taking advantage of the blindness with which Austria had struck the French government, united with her to oppose Prussia, which the Cabinet of Versailles had attacked with so much folly, when it ought to have employed all its efforts to create in Germany the Prussian power, if it had not already existed there. Could not Russia better evince her solicitude for the equilibrium of Europe, than by undermining the independence of Sweden, which was only saved by the revolution of 1772? Or, by preparing the annihilation of Poland, by the first partition, in which every observer beheld the gem of the most dreadful commotions? Is it then, also, to insure the balance of power in Europe, that Russia has employed against the Ottoman Porte the force of her arms, the resources of intrigue, and repeated invasions? At one period (which can never be obliterated from the memory of all mankind), in 1791, the same minister who governs Great Britain at this moment, raised a cry of alarm against Russia. There was nothing less than an opposition the most decided in public opinion, and even in the parliament, to prevent recourse to arms, for the purpose of defending against Russia the equilibrium of Europe. And what was the object then? To obtain some amelioration in favour of Turkey, in the conditions of peace. What, then, can the present minister say now, when the Emperor of Russia is as well obeyed in Constantinople as at St. Petersburg?—But the time of political combinations is passed; it has given place to a junction of hateful passions. It must be confessed, that the most perfect harmony reigns, in this respect, between England and Russia. We need no other proof of this wonderful concord, than the very mission of that negotiator, whom we have affected to announce to Europe as the Angel of Peace; who was every moment at Court and to remain; whose journey was

so tardy, whose return was so precipitate.—You have not forgotten, gentlemen, what was the agony of England; her ships were wandering through every sea, to learn where the French ships appeared; every day she saw the arrival of new battalions on our coasts; the necessary barks to transport numerous armies, united in those ports best situated for sending out the expedition. All was prepared; they only waited him from whom victory is never separated; but, in the midst of these most formidable preparations, his heart has not, for one single instant, swerved from the wish for peace; he strove to cherish this generous hope so long as Austria was not ready to throw down the gauntlet. I appeal to your memory, gentlemen, that hardly had we learned that the Russian negotiator had gone back, than we learned the movements of the Austrian troops. Thus they professed a desire for peace only, that they might the better prepare for war; and whilst they announced the noble ambition of restoring tranquillity to Europe, they disposed themselves to deluge it in blood.—It is impossible to dissemble, gentlemen, that England has obtained a great advantage; but is it over us or over her own allies?—Our August Monarch, in preparing to punish the perjury of the English, flattered himself, that the calamities of war would not be extended to the Continent. He had been so generous! Could he have suspected perfidy? He is so powerful! Could he have imagined that they would dare to defy him? When a coalition, conducted as a conspiracy, comes to interrupt the execution of his projects, it does not result, that they must be abandoned. The whole of his forces will not be directed against England, but will dispute with her the sea, at the same time that he subdues the provinces of her allies. Perhaps, even she may prepare for him other triumphs. Has she not made the flattering menace of employing a part of her troops upon the Continent?—In a word, should the chances of a Continental war answer the hopes we are authorised to form, from that moment it will be decided, that the fortune of England must bend under the ascendancy of France.—If, then, the British government, for the moment, diminishes its dangers, if it turn the thunder on its allies, it is only over their blindness that it triumphs. How has it happened that Austria has so soon forgotten so many reverses? How does it happen that she is so completely ignorant of the difference of the epochs? When she adopted this system of eternal enmity, of fallacious negotiations, of wars incessantly interrupted





and rekindled, she regarded time as a precious auxiliary. All was changeable in France, except the courage of her armies. Troubles incessantly starting up, threatened every day to annihilate the result of the most splendid victories. Every instant afforded reason to fear, that all the resources of administration would be at once destroyed. Too well acquainted with our misfortunes, to which they are no strangers, our enemies consoled themselves for the loss of a battle, with the hope of the news of an insurrection. But what have those times in common with the present? Eternal agitations have given place to tranquillity the most profound; the fury of change is converted into the spirit of perfecting. The energy of the nation, which had been absorbed in civil troubles, is now entirely turned to useful labours. The sentiments of domestic enjoyments are so much the more lively, as they have been so long and grievously suspended. Every day, from one extremity of the empire to the other, vows are addressed to Heaven for him who has restored to the state her splendour, and to her citizens, repose and confidence in the future. Our enemies have no more to watch the play of factions, or to hope in storms; this would be the grossest error of the strongest credulity.—If they cannot in this point deceive themselves so far upon the state of the empire, they must know still better the armies which have left them immortal remembrances. The boiling courage which distinguished them in the war of independence is not grown cold. Never was ardour more truly great, never was the confidence of the troops in themselves and in their leaders, carried farther. Those sentiments which produced those exploits, those prodigies, which Europe cannot for a long time forget, exist in all their force. Every probability unites to promise us triumphs still more brilliant, if possible. Those warriors who have acquired the admiration of the world, have never been enflamed by passions more generous, or influenced by motives more powerful over the hearts of the brave. They go to combat under the eyes of their Monarch, whom they love as their country and their glory; they go to combat under the eyes of him, whom even his enemies have named the first captain of his age.—There is another title, gentlemen, which he has not less merited, and of which he has shewn himself yet more jealous, it is that of Pacificator. The conqueror of Montenotte, of Arcole, and of Rivoli, might have conducted his army to the capital. He preferred stopping at Tolentino, to give peace to the Sovereign Pontiff. The general,

constantly victorious, who had subdued Frioul, Carniole, Carinthia, and Styria, might have been tempted to one march farther, of two days, to enter the capital of Austria. He preferred addressing to the Archduke Charles the language of peace and philanthropy, which will secure to him, from age to age, the blessings of posterity. From the time he took in hands the reins of government, what has been his first pursuit? He proposed peace. After having borne refusals, after having surpassed, in the brilliancy of his victories, the nation's hopes, he shewed himself still ready to negotiate. Already we have had occasion to remark to you, what patience he manifested in granting successively to Austria the different armistices which preceded the treaty of Luneville; with what alacrity he caught at the first words of peace, which escaped the cabinet of St. James's. The strongest proofs might farther be adduced, to shew to what an extent the love of peace is invariably implanted in the heart of his Majesty. Since the violation of the treaty of Amiens, we have many times had to tremble at seeing parricides threaten his life, and we have been compelled not to doubt but that the British government has encouraged these frightful attempts. Has not the Emperor stifled his just resentment, to listen to the voice of humanity? Never could his rights have been claimed with more eloquence and magnanimity, than in that letter to the King of England, the reading of which has filled you with such religious tenderness. The same sentiments inspired his Majesty in his late relations with Austria. Already a thousand circumstances combined to betray hostile intentions; the Emperor forced himself to doubt; he demanded explanations from the cabinet of Vienna; he returned to the charge, to obtain new information; he endeavoured to open their eyes to their true interests; he pressed all the neighbouring states to join their remonstrances to his. He went so far as to impose silence on his pride, to oppose instances of reasoning to their injurious allegations; when the armies of Austria, invading Bavaria, have annihilated every other resource but that of arms.—This heroic moderation has then been fruitless for peace; however, it will not be altogether without produce. The Emperor will find his reward in the gratitude of his people. The more the Monarch has shewn his solicitude to spare it the sacrifices required by war, the more the nation will display its zeal and energy to defend the cause of the throne and of the empire. Those who now provoke us, are the same



enemies whom we have already forced to acknowledge our independence. They now conspire against the glory of the Emperor and the splendor of France. The Emperor and France, more united than ever, by the ties of good will and fidelity, of affection and admiration, will oppose to an odious aggression, the irresistible alliance of strength and genius.—These sentiments, gentlemen, we participate with all the French; it is for us to carry to the throne the affecting declaration of them. The commission, of which I have the honour to be the organ, proposes to you to order, that there shall be drawn up an address to his Majesty the Emperor and King, to express the indignation that his faithful subjects have felt at the news of the hostile proceedings of Austria and Russia; the gratitude with which they have been penetrated, in learning all that his Majesty has done to avoid the sacrifices inseparable from a new war; the dispositions they feel to multiply the acts of devotion, the most sanguine, to avenge their Prince and their country; to shorten the war by decisive success; and to place the Emperor in a situation to dictate to his enemies a glorious and permanent peace.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**CONTINENTAL WAR.**—When the preceding sheet was going to the press, it was observed (p. 672), that, in all probability, before it reached the public, the intelligence of a general engagement, between the French and the Austrians, would be received; for, that, seeing how nearly the Russians were approaching, it was impossible to believe that Buonaparté would lose a moment in assailing the Austrians; and, in short, that, so decisive was the battle likely to be, that, it was by no means improbable, that the mail was coming on towards London with the *decision* of the fate of Europe.—Such, it now appears, was really the case; that is to say, if the battle of the 19th of October was, in all respects, what the French represent it to have been. Whether it was, or was not; whether the loss on their own side may have been diminished, and that of the Austrians augmented, in their accounts; whether, upon the whole, these accounts are fair, or whether they present gross exaggeration, it must be left to time to decide: but, in the mean while, it would be great folly, in us, not to believe, that the French have gained a very important victory; that our friends in the war have sustained a corresponding defeat; and that the consequences to ourselves may be extremely dangerous. Still greater and more inexcusable folly (to

use the mildest term applicable to the case) would it be for us to shut our eyes to those dangers; to pretend not to see them; or, seeing them, to affect to treat them with contempt.—Adversity, says the old adage, is the teacher of wisdom. To those who have minds capable of profiting from her admonitions, she is so; to those, who have the candour to confess their errors, and the courage to bear up against the difficulties to be overcome in retrieving the consequences of such errors; to these adversity is the teacher of wisdom: but, to the fool and the coward, her lessons seldom fail to give an addition of the quality, for which, respectively, they are already distinguished.—Let us hope, that, notwithstanding the ignorance, imbecility, and baseness, so prevalent in a large proportion of our public prints, country as well as town; notwithstanding this fact, so disgraceful to the character of the nation, let us hope, that there are yet a vast majority of the people of this kingdom, who are not, by adversity, however great, to be terror-stricken into either stupor of mind or inactivity of body. The way to profit from the lessons of adversity is, first to look back on the causes whence it has proceeded; and, having ascertained these, next to determine upon the means of lessening the present, and of preventing future evil of the like kind.—One of the causes of the adverse circumstances and events, which we have to lament, is, the facility, which, by means of the press, the ministers have found of deluding the people into an approbation of their measures. That continental connections are desirable; that a continental combination against Buonaparté was to be desired; no man in his senses; at least, no sensible politician, speaking with sincerity, would attempt to deny. But, though we all agreed, and still agree, perfectly agree, as to this principle of English policy, there was, at the outset of the measures, on the part of England leading to a continental coalition against France, as to the *time* and *manner*, a wide difference of opinion, decidedly and clearly expressed on the side of the Opposition, and particularly by Mr. Fox, as will be seen by a reference to the speech quoted from in my motto, and which speech (now worthy of the attention of every one) will be found at full length in the Parliamentary Debates, Vol. V. p. 536, upon the subject of His Majesty's message calling upon the Commons for a supply to enable him to subsidise powers upon the continent. This ground of objection having been stated; the urging of Austria into a war at this mo-



ment; the plunging of her into hostilities in an unprepared state, having been deprecated, and the ministers having, apparently done so (as was suggested at the time and frequently since) for the purpose chiefly of retaining their power by the means of the reputation to be acquired from being considered as the authors of a combination against France; in this state of things, it became, on their part, necessary to put public opinion on their side; it became useful to them, that the people should think, that the situation of Buonaparté was dangerous in the extreme, and that, to the allies, danger was proportionably small.—The partizans of the minister, therefore, began to exert all their powers of misrepresentation as to these matters, a happy specimen of which exertion may, if the reader can have forgotten it, be referred to, in the present volume, p. 491. The troops and the subjects of Austria were, we were told, all burning with zeal in the cause, while, as to those of Napoleon, the latter were upon the point of rebelling openly, and the former were deserting by hundreds. The specimen here referred to was taken from the *SUN* news-paper: that to which I am now about to recall the attention of the reader, is taken from the *Morning-Post*.—"That hostilities, therefore, have already commenced, we do not entertain a doubt; the precise time, place, and manner, may not yet be so easily ascertained. But while the French indulge in their usual characteristic boasts, that nothing can check their rapid and victorious career, one circumstance has at least occurred, which, if it exists to the extent we have heard, must appear ominous, if not prove fatal to them in the outset of the war in Italy. We have been assured that the camp of Marengo is broken up, a measure which was *fearfully* and *abruptly* resolved upon, on account of the *daily* and *numerous* desertions of the French soldiers, who formed the principal force of that camp. They are said to desert in bodies of two and three hundred men at a time, with their arms, and to return direct to France. There are many other symptoms of fear and alarm betrayed by the French."

—At other times, we were assured, from the same high authorities, that "the tyrant had given himself up to despair;" that "the day of retribution was at hand;" and, that "fear had over-powered those faculties, which he had been thought to be endued with." This great good to England and to Europe having been produced, there remained nothing to do but to ascribe the merit of it to the English mi-

nistry, and particularly to Mr. Pitt. This was done in all the ministerial papers, almost every day, and in forms as various as the nature of the case and the minds of the writers would admit of. One only out of two hundred and fourteen paragraphs, having this object evidently in view, I shall here insert from the *Morning Post* of the 5th of September.—"We shall not here remark on the impediments which certain writers constantly throw in the way of a grand continental alliance, at the same time that they acknowledge such an alliance is the only means of opposing an effectual barrier to the encroachments and outrages of the French government, and the only means of re-establishing the tranquillity of Europe on a secure and lasting basis. We shall not comment on the want of patriotism that was so painfully striking in the language of those who told the country, that no alliance was to be expected while Mr Pitt was minister" [We never told the country so] "who, in order to make good this good-natured assurance, told the continental powers that they could expect nothing but ruin from an alliance with a government of which Mr. Pitt was the first minister; and who, now that a confederacy is formed on the grandest scale, and for the noblest objects, tell the British people and the nations of the Continent, that defeat, disappointment, and destruction, will be the only fruit of their glorious spirit, and honourable exertions. The vexation of so great an achievement by an obnoxious minister, may have counteracted and suppressed in persons of an opposite party, the joy which every one else must feel at the accomplishment of an object universally acknowledged to be most desirable to us, and most auspicious to the deliverance of Europe. But all those who do not attach themselves to party, independent of every consideration of the good of their country, must feel rejoiced, that this great good is attained, and must, of course, feel grateful to the government that has effected it. But there is still a stronger sensation than gratitude to ministers, which will render it an indispensable duty to those who have the interest of their country at heart, to support the vigorous measures and the grand exertions which government will have now to make. The great impulse of every patriotic mind must be to strengthen and support the effort on which the fate of the country, of Europe, and of the World depends so much. We should hope and trust, that even the



"most decided of the leaders of opposition will see, in the accomplishment of this *grand object of British negotiation*, strong grounds for restraining the violence of their attacks; and that if it does not render them more friendly to the ministers who have done *so great a service*, it will at least prevent them from repressing the spirit, from checking the energies, from depressing the resources, and paralysing the efforts of the country at a moment so eventful."—This latter part is an exhortation in favour of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville. We are not (to use this half French and half English cant) to *paralyse* the efforts of the country, by "occupying", as the writer further on expresses himself, "the attention of ministers with matters of inferior moment, the discussions relating to which tend to injure rather than to add respectability to the characters of our statesmen, and, thereby, to weaken the government" [alias Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville] "in more ways than one."—Returning to the paragraph above quoted; we, the opponents of Mr. Pitt, deny, or, at least, the editor of this work does, that he ever told the country, or that he ever, for one moment, thought, that no alliance against France, upon the continent, was to be expected, while Mr. Pitt should be minister. On the contrary, we always said, that nothing was easier than for Mr. Pitt to get powers enough to accept of subsidies, and subsidies necessarily imply an alliance. But, we did give it as our opinion, that, while this gentleman should remain minister of England, there was no reason to expect such an alliance as would tend to the restoration of the balance of European power, and, of course, to the permanent tranquility and security of this kingdom. Whether we really did "tell the continental powers, that they could expect nothing but ruin from an alliance with a government of which Mr. Pitt was the first minister;" whether we did, afterwards, "tell the British people and the nations of the Continent, that defeat, disappointment, and destruction would be, in case of such an alliance, the only fruit of their exertions;" whether we did so distinctly and so unconditionally state these forebodings, I, for my own part, shall not pretend to "charge my memory," to use a phrase of Mr. Pitt upon the affair of the loan to Boyd and Benfield; but, *if we did*, I trust, we shall now be acquitted of all blame, even by those, who were then the most strongly inclined to censure us; I trust, indeed, that we, then reproached by

this hireling scribe, this seller of paragraph-room by the inch, with a "*want of patriotism*"; I trust, that *we* shall, by all sensible and *truly* public-spirited and loyal men, now be thought entitled to some "gratitude" from our country and from our King, for having, in due time, checked the effects of delusion; for having prepared the people for an exertion of that fortitude, of which their country now stands so much in need; and for having diminished that disappointment, which, had it not been for us, would, at this moment, have made so fearful an addition to the evil consequences of the disasters, out of which it would, and must, have arisen.—Collaterally with the delusion relative to the war upon the Continent ran another, of less importance to be sure, but not unworthy of notice here; I mean, respecting the maritime means of the enemy, particularly as exerted by the sending out from, and keeping at sea, the squadron from Rochefort. "What other divisions," said the ORACLE of the 5th of September, "may have sailed, the British Moniteur" [meaning the Morning Chronicle] "best knows its authority, if it has any besides that of its own fabrication. But, however *annoying* it may be to the *internal enemies of the country*, we have the satisfaction to assure our readers, that the *sea is perfectly clear*, and that not a doubt remains on the minds of the mercantile interest, that all our valuable convoys will arrive unmolested and uninjured."—The next day, the Morning Post assured its readers: "With respect to the Rochefort Squadron, little doubt is entertained of its having re-entered port, and a squadron is immediately to be detached from the Channel Fleet, to blockade that force; a service, which there will be no difficulty in performing, even throughout the winter, from the very convenient situation of the bay. The whole of the enemy's naval force may, therefore, be *now* considered *hermetically sealed up* in their respective skulking places; and should any part of them have the temerity to venture out, the result, we may confidently predict, cannot fail proving brilliant and glorious on our part."—The reader will perceive, that, for having intimated an apprehension (for it was really nothing more), that some of our merchantmen might fall into the hands of the enemy, the editor of the Morning Chronicle is, in a way by no means difficult to comprehend, accused of being one of "the *internal enemies of the country*," of which description of persons, we have not, be it observed by the bye,



heard before, since the election at Brentford. He is represented as a person, who must naturally be "*annoyed*" at the circumstance of our convoys being able to sail in safety; his paper is called by a name calculated to produce the impression that it is supported by the French government, and is, of course, devoted to its interest; in short, he is stigmatized as an enemy to his country and a traitor to his Sovereign: nor, should there, unhappily, ever exist the *power* sufficient to give effect to a *disposition* like that by which the UPSTART controler of the ORACLE is well known to be actuated in common with the rest of his faction, ought we to be at all surprised, if a person intimating, like the editor of the Morning Chronicle, his apprehension for the safety of our fleets, were to be indicted and harrassed half to death, upon a charge of compassing the death of the King! The reader now knows what foundation there was, in the case referred to, for such an apprehension; and he will, of course, want nothing more to enable him to award the degree of indignation due to this writer in the ORACLE, as well as to others of the same description.—There are not, I am aware of it, wanting persons to maintain, that, truly or falsely, no disastrous event should ever be anticipated; persons who say (as was observed elsewhere) with the Israelites, "prophecy to us smooth things; "prophecy to us lies;" but, those persons should recollect, that, in company with this disposition, existed, that baseness, that degeneracy, that want of all public virtue, all those degrading propensities and crimes, which finally drew down on them that dreadful denunciation that preceded the laying waste of their country, and the carrying of their persons into slavery.—So far is this disposition from arising out of a love of country; so far is it from proceeding from real public spirit or real loyalty, that it generally proceeds from a source of a nature directly the contrary. Some persons there certainly are, who from mere ignorance, and some who from unreflecting fear, fall, by degrees, into a habit of anticipating nothing unfavourable to the measures of the ministry, and of censuring, with or without reason, all those who anticipate otherwise; but, a little attention will soon convince us, that out of every hundred of these indiscriminating *hoppers* and *expectors*, ninety-nine hope and expect, not for their country, but for *themselves*. Long habit has, perhaps, deceived many of them; but, let almost any one of those, who so charitably accused us of "a want of patriotism," we, who expressed our fears of the success of Buonaparté; let

almost any one of those just and charitable persons examine well into the motives, by which he was actuated in preferring that accusation; let him dive into his heart, and, if his discoveries do not scare him from the pursuit, he will find *self*, grovelling dirty self, at the bottom. He will find there, instead of a real love of his country, some place, some pension, some contract, some job, something or other, by the means of which (dependant upon the duration of the ministry) he hopes to be enabled to prey upon the carcase of that country.—Such persons, and the mode of reasoning which they adopt, will always be found most to prevail, during an administration that lives by trick and expedient. Such a ministry depends for its existence upon the success of deception. As long as the people can be deluded, as long as they can be carried on, buoyed up from one hope to another; so long such a ministry may exist; but, in a country, where the voice of the people has its due weight, it will exist not one moment longer.—Guarding ourselves against delusion in future, we must also endeavour to guard ourselves against the other causes, which have led to the present disasters, and the principal of those causes evidently is, want of wisdom in our councils, or, a want of that sort of feeling in public men, which would lead to a resignation of their places, when too feeble, either in talents or in the public confidence to enable them to conduct the affairs of the nation in a manner agreeably to her interests, leaving their own private interests or gratifications quite out of the question. The partisans of the ministry, and particularly those who are devoted (and for good cause!) to Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, seem to be fully aware of what can and will be said, and of what the people think upon this subject. They have, ever since the alliance upon the Continent, began to assume an air of activity, been engaged in strenuous endeavours to impress upon the minds of the people, a persuasion, that all the *merit* of that alliance, and especially of the "*wonderful activity* of the allied powers," was to be ascribed to the "all-commanding genius" of Mr. Pitt "True," said the UPSTART, after having abused me for comparing Mr. Pitt's merit, in this case, to the merit of the workmen who brought a claim for such exertion to quell the flames at Westminster Abbey church, by having first caused the fire; "true," said the *loyal* UPSTART, on the 28th September, "the alliance would, in time, have grown, perhaps, out of the oppressed state of the "continental powers, but who has quick-



"ened it into action? Mr. Pitt. Who has hastened Austria, at other times so tardy, to march 200,000 men" [mark the number and the place] "to within thirty leagues of the frontiers of France? Mr. Pitt. Who has made the *USURPING* Braggart with draw his troops from opposite our shores, and hurry them away with the hope (vain hope, we trust!) of stopping the progress of the veteran MACK and his gallant army? Who? We ask the Opposition; who, but Mr. Pitt?—But, whatever the answer of the Opposition may be, we doubt not that the voice of parliament will, at a very early date of the ensuing session, convince them that the country is grateful for these mighty and successful exertions; and that it will not again see with pleasure the precious time of the ministry wasted in vexatious inquiries."—Always closing, you see, with a broad hint at the subject nearest his heart!—Now, reader, prepare yourself; duly prepare yourself, for such an instance of tergiversation as you have never before witnessed, and as, I hope, you never will witness again. You have heard the partisans of the ministry speaking before the intelligence of the defeats of the Austrians was received; now listen to their language since the receipt of that intelligence: here how they now speak of "the veteran MACK," and of "the veteran MACK's Sovereign too." In the same, or nearly similar sentiments, the COURIER, the ORACLE, the SUN, and the MORNING POST have joined; but, we will confine ourselves to the COURIER; and, though the extracts will be long, certain I am that they will be found worth recording. Observe, the language of the ministerial papers, which we are now about to listen to. We are going to hear what they now say about "the veteran MACK," and about that "quicken'd march," that *hasty* advance to "within thirty leagues of the frontiers of France," the sole merit of which they before ascribed to the "all-commanding genius of Mr. Pitt," and of the country's gratitude for which the voice of parliament was soon to convince the Opposition.—"In a situation of affairs so difficult, [29th of October] at a crisis so tremendous, the Opposition remain true to the character which Mr. Wilberforce gave of them, that if they did not wish the total overthrow and ruin of the country, they wished for just so much public calamity and distress as would serve to get Mr. Pitt out and themselves in. All the misfortunes of the Austrian arms are imputed

"to Mr. Pitt—he is the only person to blame for the *imbecility and supineness* of General Mack;" [no longer the "veteran Mack"] "and the minister of Great Britain is alone responsible for those movements and operations which have been attended with such disastrous effects. But, in the name of common sense, did any one suppose that in any coalition with Austria we were to have the choice of the generals who were to command her armies? Was any one stupid enough to imagine that Mr. Pitt was to be required to point out the general that would be most agreeable to him? That he was to draw out the plan of the campaign, to trace the march, and to point out the positions which the Austrian troops were to occupy? Not a fortnight ago, when affairs wore a more cheering aspect, and the Opposition thought that success might attend the Austrian arms, they were amazingly anxious to convince the country, that Mr. Pitt, having had no hand in the formation of the coalition, could have no right to any participation of the glory it might acquire. But no sooner has the prospect become clouded, no sooner has disaster attended the arms of the allies, than Mr. Pitt is welcome to all the blame and censure which an *ill contrived plan of operations* may deserve. He is blamed, too, for not having made any diversion in support of Austria.—But had he or any man reason to suppose that Mack [What! plain Mack already!] "would act as he has done, or that he would prefer entering upon the war before the arrival of the Russians? Had he waited for them, had he fallen back upon the Inn, or never advanced beyond it, the Expedition, which is now ready for sailing, would have reached its destination, by the time the combined Austrians and Russians were ready to commence operations upon the frontiers of Bavaria. Had General Mack fallen back to wait for the Russians, he would have produced another good effect, and have given more time for Prussia to have interposed. But even here the Opposition, who would not allow Mr. Pitt the slightest credit for having indisposed Prussia towards France, will be very ready, we perceive, to impute to him all the blame, should Buonaparté regain his influence over the Prussian cabinet, which they seem to think he will easily have it in his power to do by negotiation, or by the success of the war."—I think we may safely defy the

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world to produce an instance of baseness equal to this. Here is General Mack *censured* and abused for having done that, for which Mr. Pitt was *praised for having caused him to do!* But, let us hear a little more of this, in the same paper of Wednesday last.—“The discontented in this country, the jobbers in politics, and the retainers of faction, will now extol the genius of Buonaparté to the highest pitch, representing him as something supernatural, who cannot be resisted; thus shaking the confidence and courage of the people of England, and weakening our national strength. There is nothing so much to wonder at in the prowess of Buonaparté on this occasion, as in the *imbecility*, to call it by no worse a name, of General Mack. *Those who laid down the plan of the campaign, too, cannot escape blame;* but above all things they are blameable for choosing such a creature to command a great army as General Mack, whose intellects seem to be of the very lowest order. What had he ever done in war? Nothing. He had gained the confidence of Colonel Craufurd, indeed, who, in our House of Commons, was *perpetually* quoting and extolling him, founding all his lessons on tactics on the great authority of General Mack. Among other things he concurred with Mack in maintaining, that 60,000 men were sufficient to beat any army, however numerous; that beyond 60,000 men additional numbers were weakness, not strength. Alas! that Mack could not prove this by practical experience against Buonaparté. General Mack, we fear, has talked it as well at Vienna as Colonel Craufurd did among the Opposition in the House of Commons. He is no doubt a plausible *talking fellow without brains*, and has imposed upon those who know no more than himself. General Mack is the *wretched instrument*, which some unskillful hands have used. There is an old story which he brings to mind, King James of England showing Waller the poet some pictures, among others, that of Queen Elizabeth: Waller observed, that she was a wise princess. ‘Aye,’ said King James, ‘she had wise counsellors.’ ‘Please your Majesty,’ replied Waller, ‘did you ever know a fool have wise counsellors.’—It is to the want of common sense in General Mack, and not to any very superior genius in Buonaparté, that we are to impute the sad reverse of affairs on the Continent. The only manoeuvre the French played off was,

“that, in their newspapers, and even in some official documents, they represented that all their efforts were directed to Italy, that the army of Italy would be immense, and that it would move on to Vienna. This probably made the Austrians send more troops to Italy, and less to Germany than they otherwise would have done, while the design of the French was to bring their main forces into Germany, there to take great steps, leaving their troops in Italy on the defensive. Hence the Austrians sent reinforcements from Italy, where they had expected the first attack, to General Mack, on whom, contrary to expectation, they found the first attack was made. But this was a trivial advantage on the part of the French, and would have served them but little, had Mack retreated when he found himself overpowered by numbers, as he must have done in the end of September, since he sent to Italy for reinforcements, and received them. Bonaparte does not deserve so much praise for the result of affairs in Germany as he did for the battle of Marengo, while Mack deserves far more censure than General Melas. Melas was victorious; he was led away too far in pursuit of a defeated enemy, which no where could stand against him: and he might not expect that a new raised raw army, coming by a difficult passage, could master his veterans flushed with triumph. He was in active warfare led astray by the advantages he had gained; and, not without apparent reason, he viewed the French army from Dijon with contempt. But Mack was not in active war previous to his being surrounded; he was not led astray by any successes, nor was he at the head of victorious soldiers; yet he saw the chosen troops of France (so much more numerous than his own, that he sent to Italy for reinforcements) selected, embodied, and commanded by Buonaparté in person, advancing on him, past him, and around him, without making one effort to retire, or to keep on that side of his opponents which would enable him to join his friends. Melas was blamed for want of prudence and foresight; but what shall we say of Mack? In *charity* we must suppose him to be the *most stupid of all God's creatures*, notwithstanding Colonel Craufurd's admiration and panegyrics.” — This poor, miserable attempt to saddle the Opposition with General Mack is perfectly ridiculous; but, far other feelings than those



accompanying ridicule ought to be excited, and, let us hope will be excited, by this unmannerly, this foul, this base abuse of a distinguished general (in the service of our principal ally) against whose honour and fidelity nothing has been alleged, and whose conduct in the instance referred to may, for aught this writer can know, have been as gallant and even as judicious as that of any other man would have been under similar circumstances. "The *imbecility* and *incapacity*" of General Mack cannot, from this quarter, but remind the public of the "*incapacity* and *imbecility*" imputed to the Addingtons only just six months before Mr. Pitt solicited them to join him in the ministry. Those who reflect on that; those who reflect on the language made use of towards the Addingtons, by the man who had selected them for office and recommended them to the House of Commons, will be the less surprized to hear his partisans calling the "*veteran Mack*," in "*charity*" calling the "*veteran Mack*," after his defeat, "*the most stupid of all God's creatures!*" General Mack may possibly be, "*a TALKING fellow without brains*," and, if he be, there would be no rational ground for wonder at any folly or mischief he might be guilty of; for, Gracious God! what follies, what fooleries, what mighty, what terrible mischiefs, what national sufferings and what national disgrace, have arisen from the councils and the influence of "*a plausible talking fellow without brains!*" Would that all such fellows were methodist preachers, or mountebank doctors; or, any thing but politicians and regulators of armies! They are every where, when off a stage, detestable, but, that king or people who listens to them in military affairs shall rue it. The genius of war seems to say, with a voice of thunder, woe unto the nation that trusts its glory, or its defence, to the guardianship of "*a plausible talking fellow without brains!*"—But, observe me well; let me not be misinterpreted; I mean not to say, or to insinuate, that General Mack is such a fellow. We can know very little of the circumstances that produced his defeat; and, as to "*the plan of the campaign*;" as to his "*not waiting* for the "*Russians*," as to his advancing too near to the French frontiers, these writers certainly forget, that, previous to the receipt of the news of the defeat, they had attributed that plan and all those advanced movements solely to the

"*all-commanding genius* of Mr. Pitt!"—They perceive the effect of these their former representations: they are well aware of it: they are all upon the alert to remove it, to wear it out of the public mind, or to disfigure the impression, if possible. With this object in view they stick at nothing. The Emperor of Austria, or, at the very least, his ministry, are involved in the censure and abuse, bestowed upon General Mack. "Those who laid down the plan of the campaign cannot," we are told "escape blame;" they are said to have no more sense than General Mack; no more sense than "*a talking fellow without brains*;" and a clumsy story is resorted to in order to convey the idea of their being *fools*, without using the term directly. And, observe well (for this is the main point) all this is said, by a ministerial paper, in a defence of Mr. Pitt against the charge, the *anticipated* charge, of having *precipitated* the movements of the Austrians, and having, thereby, been the principal cause of their overthrow. This charge would have been made, without doubt, when parliament came to meet; for, whatever different views men might entertain as to continental connexions in general, or as to an alliance at this present time, all men who reflected must have been of Mr. Fox's opinion as to the impolicy, the extreme danger, of hurrying Austria into a war, or, as the Pittites exultingly called it, of "*quicken*ing the alliance into action," before Austria was duly prepared. The "*voice of parliament*" will not, therefore, be so forward to express its gratitude for this favour; and, indeed, it is truly shocking to contemplate the motive, to which it is but too obvious these writers attribute the war. What did they mean by saying, that, when parliament met, it would show the "*gratitude of the country*," and that it would not "*again see with pleasure the precious time of the ministry wasted in vexatious inquiries?*" What did they mean by this? Are we to understand them as regarding the subsidies granted and the continental war exacted merely to answer a *domestic purpose*? Shocking idea! Let us hope, that, here, at least, their minds have outstripped those of their superiors! [Here I must break off. The other parts of the subject, as elucidated by more recent intelligence, shall be discussed in my next.]

Botley, Thursday,  
31st Oct. 1805.